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Abstract
This paper studies Chinese grape growers’ time discounting 
and its implications for the adoption of technology that can 
reduce the negative effects of increasing precipitation. Using 
primary data collected in Xinjiang Province, we undertook 
a contingent valuation of rain covers that protect fruit from 
rain and estimated a discounted utility model using these 
data. Using a hierarchical Bayesian approach, we find that 
local grape growers discount the future very heavily, with 
a discount rate of 0.17 per year, which is almost four times 
higher than the Chinese market interest rate. Farmers also 
tend to underestimate the benefits of adopting covers, with 
their purchase decisions appearing to largely depend on 
their past actual losses rather than future anticipated losses. 
These findings have broader implications for policies pro-
moting proactive adaptation in response to likely increased 
rainfall in the region. Targeting farmers who give lower 
weight to events far off in the future and understanding that 
many farmers may tend only to make adoption decisions 
that have strong short- term benefits could improve the effi-
cacy of climate policies that target agricultural technologies.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Grape production is particularly vulnerable to precipitation. Good growing conditions re-
quire ‘rain at the right moment’. In particular, precipitation during veraison (the stage from 
berry growth to ripening), and during harvest, increases the likelihood of fungal disease and 
causes grapes to rot and mould, affecting yield and market acceptability (Agosta et al., 2012).
Xinjiang, the study area of this paper, has the highest grape yields and planted areas among 
all of China's provinces (National Bureau of Statistics, 2017). According to meteorological 
data from NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), regional precipitation 
has been increasing in frequency and intensity since 1951 (NOAA, 2019). This trend threat-
ens local farmers’ livelihoods. For example, rain showers in August 2018 caused over 60% 
of grapes to rot in Huangtian, as reported by Xinjiang Production and Construction Crops 
Thirteenth Division of Government Affairs (2018).
Since 300 bc, farmers in Xinjiang have traditionally grown grapes in open irrigated fields, 
due to the relatively low annual rainfall (Jiang et al., 2009). Thompson Seedless is the lead-
ing variety planted in Xinjiang, and it has long been popular in the region, in part because 
the environmental conditions there have historically been particularly suitable. However, this 
variety is highly susceptible to fungal diseases which spread easily in warm and humid en-
vironments (Satisha et al., 2008). Currently, the main methods farmers choose to deal with 
such diseases are to plant alternative cultivars, spray pesticides, and pick out rotten fruits 
after rainfall. Yet these strategies already have limitations, and they may become less viable 
as climatic conditions gradually become warmer and wetter (Piao et al., 2010). New cultivars 
usually need at least three years before they produce fruit, and therefore growers do not have 
revenue during that time. The pesticides that are currently used by farmers are not particularly 
effective and may have potential negative impacts on consumers’ health and environmental 
pollution (Mesnage & Séralini, 2018). Farmers do not necessarily take account of these exter-
nalities when making their decisions. For example, some interviewees who complained about 
the efficacy of pesticides suggested adding oil to the pesticide. This can help to repel water 
from the grape and so reduce damage, yet it makes it more difficult for consumers and com-
panies to clean the grapes before consumption. Finally, removing rotten fruit is costly and 
labour- intensive.
Rain covers have proven to be more effective than fungicide sprays with respect to reducing 
losses, and improving yields and profits (Du et al., 2015). They also reduce the negative health 
externalities caused by pesticides, though they can increase plastic pollution (Chavarria et al., 
2007; Li et al., 2014). The current market price of rain covers is around 700– 800 yuan/mu 
(£0.12/m2– £0.13/m2). To encourage uptake, the local government is currently providing a rain 
cover subsidy of 500 yuan/mu (about £0.08/m2) to the first 2000 adopters of rain covers in the 
region. Yet despite the proven effectiveness and subsidisation of these covers, few farmers are 
using this new technology and few have taken up the government's offer.1
We seek to determine why adoption rates of rain covers are so low, despite their effective-
ness, and what policies might be implemented to promote greater adoption. The existing lit-
erature highlights a number of factors that are likely to influence farmers’ willingness to take 
measures to adapt to weather variability. These include demographic factors (Deressa et al., 
2011; Fosu- Mensah et al., 2012; Le Dang et al., 2014); resource availability (Bryan et al., 2009; 
Falco et al., 2014); and social barriers (Adger, 2003; Vulturius & Gerger Swartling, 2015). Some 
researchers have also demonstrated that psychological factors, such as climate change beliefs, 
risk perceptions, attitudes toward innovation (Mase et al., 2017); attitudes toward risk (Alpizar 
et al., 2011); and the psychological distance of risk (Azadi et al., 2019), may also affect farmers’ 
actions.
 1Personal correspondence with lead author during data collection, 2019.
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Adaptation is an intertemporal behaviour. Farmers often need to act now to be prepared 
for climate events that will take place in the future (Bernedo & Ferraro, 2017). Therefore, it 
is important to consider individuals’ discount rates. Though few studies explore the relation-
ship between farmers’ time preference/discounting and their response to anticipated future 
weather variability, we can still gain some knowledge from the limited existing literature. For 
example, Stein and Tobacman (2016) found that people with higher discount rates have higher 
willingness- to- accept weather insurance. Ngoma et al., (2019) found farmer impatience was 
negatively related to the likelihood of adopting climate- smart agriculture.
We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we have designed a novel experiment to 
elicit individual farmers’ discount rates. This format is linked more closely to the research 
context than the typical method of binary choice lists applied in most studies using individual 
time discounting. Our design also considers the temporal nature of the problem, which has 
been largely ignored or framed as a static problem in the majority of contingent valuation or 
choice modelling studies. Secondly, we explore the extent to which farmers underestimate the 
benefits from future adaptive strategies and whether this inhibits the promotion of adaptive 
technologies, especially those that require relatively large initial investment.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 builds the utility model and describes the design of the experiment and methods for 
data analysis. Section 4 states the empirical results. Section 5 discusses the main findings and 
provides possible policy suggestions.
2 |  LITERATU RE REVIEW A N D H Y POTH ESES
There is limited literature that explores the links between individuals’ discount rates and their 
adoption of proactive measures to respond to future weather variability. However, we get some 
insights from research in energy efficiency, that addresses the relationship between prefer-
ence and behavioural factors and the adoption of energy- efficient technologies. For example, 
households may discount future energy savings, which is one of the internal barriers to adopt-
ing energy- efficient technologies (Newell & Siikamäki, 2015).
To reduce the influence of cognitive bias, some researchers have explored how more effec-
tive policies can be designed to encourage more successful adoption. De Groote and Verboven 
(2019) suggest that promoting the adoption of solar photovoltaic systems should be through 
subsidies for future electricity production rather than through subsidies for upfront invest-
ment. Langer and Lemoine (2018) designed a subsidy schedule that is informed by consum-
ers’ characteristics. If households are myopic, the subsidies can increase strongly over time; if 
households have rational expectations, the time profile of the efficient subsidy will be flatter.
Although the adoption of adaptive strategies to changing rainfall patterns has some similar-
ities with investment in energy- efficient technologies, there are also differences. Individuals’ 
decisions over whether to take proactive or reactive measures closely depend on the external 
environment, in this case, rainfall patterns. However, due to the complexity of natural and 
anthropogenic process (Pachauri et al., 2014), it is hard for farmers to predict how, and to what 
extent, future weather and climate patterns will evolve. Compared with energy- saving tech-
nologies, the benefits of adaptation are more uncertain. Uncertainty can augment individuals’ 
discount rates, and this can partly explain the high discount rates found in other empirical 
studies (Wilkinson & Klaes, 2012). Motivated by these findings from the literature, we arrive 
at our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: A grape grower in Xinjiang is likely to heavily discount the benefits from the 
adoption of rain covers.
We judge whether the discount factor is high by comparing the value of the farmer's dis-
count rate to the market interest rate. Adopting rain covers is an intertemporal investment 
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with a relatively high upfront cost. The purchasing farmer must decide whether or not to make 
a one- time upfront investment based on the predicted accumulated utility value over the cov-
ers’ lifespan. The utility value from covers comes from reduced crop damage. However, farm-
ers may be budget constrained, or they may not have sufficiently valued the benefits (Gong 
et al., 2014; Weber & Chapman, 2005). Farmers with higher discount rates might be expected 
to be less likely to make long- term investments, all other things constant, choosing alternative 
management approaches that provide more immediate benefits and that have lower upfront 
costs (Hallegatte et al., 2012), such as spraying pesticides or pruning rotten grapes. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2 states:
Hypothesis 2: Farmers with higher discount rates are less likely to adopt rain covers.
3 |  M ETHODOLOGY
Methods to elicit individuals’ discount rates can broadly be divided into two categories: ex-
perimental studies and field studies (Frederick et al., 2002). In experimental studies, research-
ers generally apply the method of classic binary choice lists, as initially designed by Coller and 
Williams (1999) and Harrison et al., (2002). Respondents are required to choose from a smaller 
but more immediate payoff or a larger but more delayed payoff (Bezabih, 2009). In field stud-
ies, discount rates are inferred from people's intertemporal economic decisions in real- world 
scenarios rather than hypothetical choices (Frederick et al., 2002).
It has been argued that experimental studies seem to get more precise results compared with 
field studies because they abstract from and simplify the complexity of real- world decisions, 
and control other important factors that may influence discount rates (Frederick et al., 2002). 
However, the experimental design needs to conform to a particular research domain and back-
ground, because even for the same individuals, different goods and services may be discounted 
at different rates (Frederick et al., 2002).
To design an experiment that is closer to the real- world experiences of farmers, we designed 
hypothetical scenarios that are reasonable representations of the real decisions that farmers 
in Xinjiang make. Instead of making farmers choose from a number of options with different 
payoffs at different times, in our experiment, farmers are told about the characteristics of rain 
covers and future rainfall conditions, and they respond with how much they are willing to 
pay for rain covers according to specific scenarios. To elicit a more precise willingness- to- pay 
(WTP) for each farmer, we incorporate the design into a multiple- bounded contingent valua-
tion framework. Multiple- bounded questions have been shown to help to provide more statis-
tical information than other contingent valuation approaches with single or double- bounded 
questions (Roach et al., 2002).
3.1 | Maximum WTP model.
We make the following assumptions. First, farmers optimise their discounted returns from 
using rain covers over the lifespan of the covers. The utility functions are linear in anticipated 
profit and cost. This strong assumption implies farmers are only concerned with the maximum 
of profit and cost minimisation, while other attributes such as the ease of installation and man-
agement, or leisure time, do not determine their choices. Second, we do not consider the role 
of risk and uncertainty. Instead, we assume that farmers are able to fully anticipate profits and 
rotting rates given a set number of rainy days. The consideration of risk and/or uncertainty 
would require a more complex treatment of the utility and value of using rain covers. The cur-
vature of the utility functions and the introduction of probabilities would be required, along 
with the elicitation of farmers’ subjective probability distributions. While the simultaneous 
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treatment of time and uncertainty remains an interesting and potentially fruitful one, it would 
also require many additional assumptions about the shape of the utility functions, and proba-
bility weighting functions if prospect theory was followed. Third, we assume that there are no 
economic losses due to rain after the adoption of rain covers. With regard to the anticipated 
losses there is also an assumption that there is a linear (though discounted) loss in utility with 
respect to these anticipated losses, which might also be challenged.
Finally, we assume the anticipated profits from grapes after using covers and not using 
covers are the same when there is no rainfall in a given period, and both can be represented by 
πi. Several papers (Lim et al., 2014; Permanhani et al., 2016) do show that the use of rain covers 
may affect fruit quality, and hence the price and profit obtained from the fruit. However, during 
the fieldwork, no farmers mentioned that a change in quality was a reason for non- adoption.
A farmer's utility, under adoption, is defined as the discounted anticipated profit over the 
life of the cover, less the cost of adoption, as follows:
where:
• πi is the ith farmer's anticipated profit from one mu of area planted to grapes (one mu is a 
Chinese farmland unit, equal to approximately 666.67 m2) in one period if there is no rain;
• T is the lifespan (in years) of plastic rain covers;
• t is the tth year;
• ri is the time discount rate of the ith farmer;
• CT is the upfront cost, incurred in period 0, of sufficient rain covers, that last the full T years, 
for one mu of farmland planted to grapes.
If a farmer does not adopt rain covers, their grapes may rot. We introduce the time invariant 
parameter δi, which represents farmer i's ‘rotting rate’ for a rainy day, which is assumed to be 
known to each farmer, but not fixed across farmers.
The farmer's utility, if they do not buy rain covers, is therefore:
where yi,t is the number of rainy days in a given period experienced by the ith farmer at time t. For 
a given value of yi,t, 
(
1 − i
)yi,t is the farmer's share of their annual profit they will lose each year 
without the protection of rain covers.
We did not ask the farmers to estimate the number of rainy days. Rather, this was set within 
the scenario offered to them. The ‘rotting rate’ is that which individual farmers know accord-
ing to their particular situation. For example, farmers with other alternative measures, such 
as spraying pesticides, may have a smaller δi, because the net loss from not using rain covers 
will be lower.
When Ucover,i ≥ Uno−cover,i, the farmer is better off purchasing the rain covers. Formally:




























































≥ CT, farmers will be willing to pay for 
rain covers, and the maximum willingness to pay (MWTP) is:
The MWTP function asserts that farmers’ preferences are determined by three properties: 
lifespan of covers (T); their cost (MWTP); and the subjective future number of rainy days (y) 
through time. We naturally assume that farmers accept the conditions provided by scenarios 
in terms of the number of rainy days and the cost of the covers. We focus on the price of covers 
acceptable to farmers (shown in the Appendix S1, Figure A1), and do not explicitly account for 
other possible costs, such as labour and installation. This simplified the scenarios and made 
them easier for farmers to understand. Farmers are likely to have implicitly factored in these 
costs when making their decisions, and would ultimately have embedded the costs in the final 
estimates of their MWTP. If farmers were unable to accurately factor in these other factors, 
this may bias the results.
3.2 | Identification of attribute levels.
To identify the attributes and levels we considered both theoretical underpinnings and 
farmers’ experiences, the latter determined through focus group discussions with three local 
farmers. After establishing the attributes (the numbers of rainy days through time, the life 
span of rain covers and the cost of covers), the next step was to assign attribute levels. First, 
according to data from NOAA (2019), the average number of rainy days (rainfall is equal or 





. Based on these historic data, explicitly including the possibility of zero rainfall 
days, we assigned six levels for each year that the rain covers last: 0 days, 2 days, 4 days, 7 days, 
10 days, and 13 days. Secondly, we considered four different time periods T for the lifespan of 
the rain covers: T = 1, 2, 3, and 4. Thirdly, from the Xinjiang Production and Construction 
Crops Thirteenth Division of Government Affairs (2018), the cost of covers with about a 3- 
year lifespan was about 700– 800 yuan per mu. Thus, we set starting prices for 1 year, 2 years, 
3 years and 4 years, respectively, to be 400 yuan, 600 yuan, 800 yuan and 1000 yuan.
3.3 | Design of the choice tasks.
As the design process (Appendix S1, Figure A2), initially, we designed 40 choice cards: 8 
cards with 1- year lifespan rain covers, 8 cards with 2- year lifespan rain covers, 12 cards with 3- 
year lifespan rain covers, and 12 cards with 4- year lifespan rain covers. Next, we divided these 
cards equally into four groups according to the lifespan. In the third step, we randomly chose 
the number of rainy days from the six predetermined levels, and for cards in which the lifespan 
is more than 1 year, we designed two scenarios to present to each respondent: an upward trend 
of rainy days over time; and a downward trend of rainy days over time.
To ensure the appropriateness of the questions, and that farmers could understand the pro-
cess, we undertook a pilot in April 2019. We first asked three local grape growers to do the 
survey separately, and then brought them together to talk about potential improvements to the 
questionnaire. We found that two of the farmers were not happy with the length of time the 
whole process took. Therefore, to avoid farmer fatigue, we reduced the number of cards each 
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cards were assigned to each person, comprising one card for covers with a 1- year lifespan, two 
cards for covers with a 2- year lifespan, two cards for covers with a 3- year lifespan, and two 
cards for covers with a 4- year lifespan. An example of one prospect for a 3- year lifespan cover 
is shown in Figure 1.
For the choice tasks, each farmer was first given a ‘starting price’ according to the covers’ 
lifespan. Specifically, the ‘starting price’ for covers with 1- year, 2- year, 3- year and 4- year lifes-
pan was 400 yuan, 600 yuan, 800 yuan and 1000 yuan, respectively. Then, the farmer indicated 
whether they would buy the rain cover for that price. Next, depending on the farmer's answer, 
the interviewer increased (if the farmer indicated they would buy the cover) or decreased (if the 
farmer indicated they would not buy the cover) the price. This was done in increments of 200 
yuan or 100 yuan. Finally, the interviewer recorded the respondent's maximum WTP on the 
price card (shown in Figure 1). This process can be described using a bidding tree, one example 
of which is provided in the Appendix S1, Figure A3.
Our questionnaire also included a section with demographic questions. The average com-
pletion time for each person was approximately 30 minutes. Farmers were each given 30 yuan 
(about £3.30) as compensation for their time spent doing the choice experiment.
3.4 | Study site and data collection.
The study area is in Liu Shuquan town in Hami city in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, 
northwest corner of China. Hami is in the Turpan- Hami basin, where almost 95% of China's 
total raisin crop is grown (Ward & Inouye, 2018). Since 1951, the amount of annual precipita-
tion and the number of days of rainfall (equal or above 0.01 inches) in Hami had exhibited an 
upward trend (shown in the Appendix S1, Figure B). The formal fieldwork started in May 2019. 
In the survey, the interviewer first required farmers to complete the WTP tasks, before asking 
them additional questions (see Appendix S1, Figure A1).
To obtain our sample of participants, with the help of the village heads, we first obtained a 
list of local grape growers and their contact information from the local government. Then, we 
randomly selected from the name list, with each grower having the same probability of being 
sampled to reduce differences between the sample and a general population sample. Our final 
sample comprised 155 farmers and 1085 observations, of which 52.26% were male, and 48.39% 
were between 40 and 50 years old. The median income per year for a family was between about 
30,000 and 50,000 yuan.
F I G U R E  1  Example of a scenario card and a corresponding price card
Scenario Card Provided for Farmers: Price Card Provided for Interviewers: 
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3.5 | Statistical analysis.
To estimate the key parameters, the empirical specification outlined in Equation (4) was 
specified in log form:
where ei is assumed to be iid normal with mean zero. This model is non- linear in parameters, 
which allows for individual farmer effects. Using classical statistical methods, this model could 
in principle be estimated as a random or mixed- effects model to allow for farmer heterogene-
ity, whereas a standard Bayesian approach would be to treat it as a hierarchical model. In the 
hierarchical Bayesian approach, the estimated parameters are treated as randomly distributed 
for distributions that are governed by their means and variances, but are not the same for each 
subject (as in the case of classical random effect models). Here we employ this Bayesian approach. 
Specifically, each of the key structural parameters was estimated as a bounded parameter using 
transformations of underlying parameters as follows:
There was a hierarchical prior structure of the form:
This is a relatively diffuse set of priors. Increasing the variance of each of the parameters 
ten- fold delivered results that were not substantively different to those presented below.
Because of the complexity of high- dimensional integrals, often it is not practical to compute 
the deterministic approximation of posterior distributions, in which case a more applicable 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method is used instead, in which a series of samples 
is drawn from probability distributions using Markov chains to converge into a target distri-
bution (Hoffman & Gelman, 2014). Here, a form of MCMC called Hamiltonian Monte Carlo 
(HMC) was employed using the Stan software.
This approach has higher performance for hierarchical models (Betancourt & Girolami, 
2015). In practice, HMC's performance is highly sensitive to three tuning parameters: discre-
tisation time, mass matrix, and the number of leapfrog steps (Stan Development Team, 2019). 
An automatic parameter tuning approach of HMC called No- U- Turn Sampler (NUTS) is ad-
opted to avoid inappropriate parameter setting of the number of steps and reduce the correla-
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is based on 16,000 samples after discarding 24,000 samples in the warm- up phase. The RHAT 
convergence stats produced by Stan were used and they showed all models converged well.
4 |  RESU LTS
4.1 | Farmers’ willingness to pay
The contingent valuation survey revealed that the average MWTP for rain covers is 884 yuan/
mu (about £0.15/m2), and the median value is 800 yuan (about £0.13). The MWTP varies con-
siderably from 50 to 3800 yuan/mu (£0.008/m2– £0.63/m2). In such a relatively small rural area, 
the reason for the apparent heterogeneity is worthy of further study. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
covers with longer life expectancies are more attractive to farmers. For covers with a 1- year, 
2- year, 3- year, or 4- year lifespan, farmers’ average maximum payment price per unit of farm-
land was 449 yuan (£0.07/m2), 735 yuan (£0.12/m2), 972 yuan (£0.16/m2), and 1162 yuan (£0.19/
m2) respectively.
4.2 | Farmers’ time discounting
Table 1 displays the distributions of estimated mean values for (γ, δ, π). From the results, the 
sampled local grape growers can be seen to have a positive average discount rate of approxi-
mately 0.17 per year. This value is considerably higher than the Chinese average interest rate of 
government bonds net of inflation at about 0.03, and average central bank lending rate net of 
inflation at around 0.05 (Li et al., 2013), thus supporting Hypothesis 1. Compared with other 
studies across the globe, the rates far exceed the estimates at 0.001 for West African farmers 
discounting financial rewards (Liebenehm & Waibel, 2014), and 0.078 for Vietnamese villag-
ers (Tanaka et al., 2010). However, they are lower than for Indian farmers at 0.23 (Bauer & 
Chytilová, 2013), and US farmers, around 0.28 (Duquette et al., 2011). The high rate suggests 
that local grape farmers discount the future heavily, tending to pay more attention to the pre-
sent. We return to this point below.
From the other two estimated parameters, δ and π, we find the average value of the 
rotting rate to be 0.55. Readers should recall that this value represents farmers’ beliefs 
about their economic losses from one rainfall event, and implies that farmers believe that 
the negative effects of rain between July to September on their harvest to be relatively 
high. This high rotting rate possibly reflects farmers’ beliefs about the weather conditions. 
According to Menapace, Colson et al., (2015), individuals who believe that the climate is 
changing tend to feel that adverse weather may cause larger future crop losses. In terms of 
this study, 91% of farmers believed the amount of precipitation has increased, and 87.1% 
TA B L E  1  The distributions of the mean value of estimated means for (γ, δ, π)
Discounted rate(γ) Rotting rate(δ)
Anticipated profit 
(yuan/mu) (π)
Average 0.17 0.55 532.04
Standard deviation 0.03 0.06 28.05
Minimum value 0.07 0.37 434.18
Maximum value 0.30 0.84 642.92
Observations 16,000 16,000 16,000
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believed the number of rainy days has increased. Most local grape growers can perceive the 
increasing trend in precipitation. This belief may increase their concerns about fruit losses 
and thus increase their beliefs about the larger economic losses from rainfall. The averaged 
anticipated annual net profit per year in the absence of rain is estimated to be 532 yuan/
mu (£0.09/m2).
Our results suggest that individual discount rates (γ), farmers’ beliefs of losses (δ), and an-
ticipated profit (π) exhibit considerable heterogeneity. Figure C in the Appendix S1 visualises 
how the three estimated parameters are distributed across farmers, and Table 2 displays the 
mean, minimum value and maximum value for these parameters by the individual. While 
these should be (and are) similar to the results reported in Table 1, there can be a divergence 
between the distribution of individual estimate mean values drawn from the sampler if the 
empirical distribution of the individuals does not perfectly conform to the assumptions un-
derpinning the hierarchical model. The long- tailed distributions reflect that individuals’ pa-
rameters disperse widely, and this can also be concluded from the large standard deviations. 
The range between the maximum and minimum are also wide due to the existence of extreme 
values. These results show the diversity for the three parameters among farmers, which may 
relate to individuals’ demographic characteristics, experiences, and management levels of 
vineyards.
4.3 | The relationship between time discounting and adoption intention
Next, we consider whether growers’ time- discounting characteristics influence their choice 
over adapting to increasing precipitation in the future. When, during the survey, farmers 
were asked whether they were likely to purchase rain covers to protect their grapes in the next 
TA B L E  2  The estimated parameters’ (γi, δi, πi) distributions for all farmers
Discounted rate Damaged rate
Anticipated profit
(yuan/mu)
Mean 0.22 0.53 601.87
Standard deviation 0.11 0.14 262.64
Minimum value 0.06 0.07 183.21
Maximum value 0.58 0.75 1414.00
Observations 155 155 155
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5 years, over one- fifth of the farmers said they were 99%– 100% sure that they would (Figure 2). 
In contrast, just over 12% reported less than a 10% likelihood.
We conducted an ordered probit regression to explore potential linkages between farm-
ers’ personal time preferences and future adoption possibilities. In the regression analysis, 
individual- level time preference is found to be a key explanatory variable, given that personal 
adoption probability (in percentage terms) over the next 5 years was the (ordinal) dependent 
variable. This statistical method is a relatively standard approach. For example, Azra Batool 
et al., (2018) used the same approach to explore the influence of demographic variables on 
economic empowerment.
The results in Table 3 suggest that only age and prior experience of losses are related to farm-
ers’ intentions to purchase, while discount rate, education level, gender, the gender of the main 
decision- maker, area of the vineyard, and general income from grapes are not statistically sig-
nificant. It is noteworthy that we obtain the prior experience of losses from farmers’ self- reports. 
We asked them this question: ‘Has your vineyard suffered profit losses from rainfall between 
July to September last year?’, and if they said yes, they chose the range in which the losses fall.
According to our findings, even though farmers tend to potentially underestimate future 
benefits of using covers, this does not greatly influence their self- reported likelihood to adopt 
them. Meanwhile, those farmers in our sample who had greater losses in the past year tended 
to have a higher probability of using covers. This important finding suggests that local farmers 
place less weight on future benefits of adopting adaptive measures and, rather, their purchas-
ing decisions largely depend on their recent prior experience. Given that there is an upward 
trend in precipitation predicted in the future, it is problematic if farmers make their adoption 
decisions based on past rainfall patterns rather than future rainfall patterns. The government 
could make efforts to increase famers’ beliefs about the effectiveness of adaptation strategies, 
especially for those who have low trust in the utility of covers.
















Gender of the main decision- maker in the household 0.05
(0.21)
0.28
Losses from the rain last year – 0.14*
(0.07)
– 1.85
Vineyard area – 0.03
(0.11)
– 0.25
General income from grapes – 0.02
(0.08)
– 0.27
Log- likelihood – 278.45
Pseudo R2 0.03
Observations 155
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
*, ** represent significance levels p = 10%, 5%, respectively.
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Another factor that influences a farmer's purchasing decision is their age. Older farmers are 
found to have lower probabilities of purchasing rain covers. Possible reasons are that elders 
are accustomed to their traditional farming practice and trust their past experience. They may 
also consider that it would take more physical effort to install and use covers.
5 |  DISCUSSION A N D CONCLUSION
We found high discount rates for our Chinese grape farmers. These discount rates imply that 
farmers are very focused on the short term and may not take sufficient action to adapt to the 
negative implications of weather variability in 10 or 20 years’ time, even if they are provided 
with evidence that these future events will take place for certain.
There are at least two sets of reasons that might explain the high discount rates estimated 
in this paper. First, the difference between real values and stated values may reflect hypothet-
ical bias (Penn & Hu, 2018). Although farmers appeared to understand the attribute levels, 
and these attribute levels were set broadly in line with reasonable projections, it is possible 
that farmers were swayed by their beliefs and/or knowledge about the cost of covers and/or 
the likely number of rainy days when making their decisions. Here, degrees of trust in the in-
vestigators and the scenarios may also play a role. For example, if farmers doubt that the rain 
covers can last as long as those presented in the scenarios, they may state that they would pay 
less for longer lifespans, thus increasing their apparent discount rates. Second, the estimates 
were derived from a model that did not explicitly take account of the impacts of risk and uncer-
tainty. Instead, we assumed farmers were able to fully anticipate profit (in the absence of rain) 
along with the rotting rate (should rain occur). In reality these would be stochastic, thus being 
subject to uncertainty. If farmers reason that values further off in the future are more variable, 
then uncertainty/ambiguity aversion may also make the certainty equivalents for equivalent 
payoffs larger in the short run. This would mean that the discount rates measured here con-
flate strict time preferences with uncertainty/ambiguity aversion. Having said this, the central 
finding that farmers are very focused on the short run would not fundamentally change.
With regard to rain covers specifically, the current local market costs of covers are about 
700– 800 yuan/mu. Our results suggest that the average and median of maximum willingness 
to pay for these covers are 884 yuan and 800 yuan respectively and, as such, at least half of the 
interviewed farmers would accept the market price. However, the actual adoption rate is less 
than 2%, (3/155), even with government subsidies for early adopters. This suggests that there 
are other factors that inhibit farmers from adoption, not just price, so the government should 
consider other approaches to encouraging adoption.
Our results further suggest that recent losses partly determine farmer perceptions of fu-
ture benefits. If farmers make decisions informed primarily by their past experience, this is 
likely to lead to sub- optimal uptake of new technologies and methods, particularly in the 
context of climate change, where the future is likely to be different from the past in the con-
text of precipitation- induced crop damage. It may therefore be necessary for policy makers 
and extension agents to put more effort into ensuring that farmers are aware of the implica-
tions of changing precipitation patterns, and thus the future benefits of adaptive strategies. 
Additionally, since farmers have considerable heterogeneity in both their willingness to pay 
and discount rates, policies may need to target those who have higher discount rates and lower 
anticipated benefits from adoption. Similar policy suggestions have been made by Olivier and 
Frank (De Groote & Verboven, 2019).
As we discussed earlier, uncertainty can augment individuals’ apparent discount rates, re-
sulting in them discounting the future more highly. This in turn would make these individuals 
more willing to adopt short- term technologies than long- term technologies. Farmers’ doubts 
about the effectiveness of covers may increase their perceived uncertainty of their effectiveness, 
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thereby affecting the adoption rate of rain covers. Therefore, building trust in the benefits 
of covers may have a positive effect on adoption rates. One way to increase farmers’ beliefs 
about the benefits may be to use particular farmers or areas as pilots to adopt rain covers and 
demonstrate their success and cost effectiveness. Currently, there are only a few effective cases 
showing on the local government website. The scope of transmission is limited, and only farm-
ers who have access to the internet can see these examples. Local government might provide 
finance for these pilot regions. And, finally, the government could regulate the manufacturing 
and sales market of rain covers so as to require the manufacturers to indicate the predicted 
lifespan to reduce farmers’ uncertainty.
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